







29 April 1994 
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 29 APRIL 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I regret to have to inform you that the Force Commander of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has reported a further deterioration of the
situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda.
The capital city is effectively divided into sectors controlled by the Rwanda
Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively, with
frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR
reports strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city
and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but
enjoy little effective protection. Massacres continue on a large scale in the
countryside, especially in the south.
new complication is that in recent days both sides have begun to express lack
of confidence in UNAMIR's impartiality and this is affecting their cooperation with my
Special Representative and the Force Commander.
These developments raise serious questions about the viability of the revised
mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR by resolution 912 on 21 April
1994. In particular, it has become clear that that mandate does not give UNAMIR the
power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres. At best it can provide
limited protection to small groups of threatened persons in the city of Kigali and it
would be unable to save them if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to
some estimates, as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last three
weeks. This humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of growing anguish in Africa
and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the international community.
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In considering what action should be taken, it has to be recognized that the
disastrous incident of 6 April which cause the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda
and Burundi has had two consequences which require different responses from the
international community. First, that incident sparked a resumption of fighting between
the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).
Secondly, it reawakened deep-rooted ethnic hatreds, which have plagued Rwanda in
the past and which have again led to massacres of innocent civilians on a massive
scale.
The revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR in resolution
912 on 21 April is an adequate response to the first of these consequences. My
Special Representative and the Force Commander have been making strenuous
efforts to help the parties agree to a cease-fire and a return to implementation of the
Arusha Accord. Those efforts have not yet succeeded but the present mandate and
strength of UNAMIR are sufficient for them to continue.
The events of the last few days have confirmed, however, that UNAMIR's
revised mandate is not one which enables it to bring the massacres under control. 
Some of these have been the work of uncontrolled military personnel but most
of them have been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the
complete breakdown of law and order in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda. It
has become clear that the horrors for which they are responsible can be ended only if
law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity.
In these circumstances, I urge the Security Council to re-examine the
decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including
forceful action, it could take, or could authorize Member States to take, in order to
restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am
of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material
resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to
contemplate. But I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its
implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leave the Security Council with
no alternative but to examine this possibility.
I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the










20 April 1994 
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
Events in Rwanda
1. The members of the Security Council are fully aware of the critical situation in
Rwanda following the crash of the plane at Kigali airport on 6 April 1994, which
caused the deaths of all those on board, including President Juvenal Habyarimana of
Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntayamira of Burundi. The cause of the crash cannot
be determined without a full investigation, which so far has not been feasible.
2. This tragic incident set off a torrent of widespread killings, mainly in Kigali but
also in other parts of the country. The violence appears to have both political and
ethnic dimensions. No reliable estimate of deaths has so far been available, but they
could possibly number tens of thousands.
3. Reliable reports strongly indicate that the killings were started by unruly
members of the Presidential Guard, then spread quickly throughout the city. Despite
the best efforts of UNAMIR, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) security battalion
quartered at the National Development Council complex broke out and started to
engage Government troops, including elements of the Presidential Guard. RPF units
from the demilitarized zone also moved towards Kigali and joined the fighting.
Authority collapsed, the provisional Government disintegrated and some of its
members were killed in the violence. An interim Government was proclaimed on 8
April 1994, but could not establish authority, and on 12 April 1994, as fighting
between the armed forces and the RPF intensified, left the capital. Since then, the
Defence Minister and the high command of the Rwandese Government Forces
(RGF), whose leadership has recently changed, appear to be the only interlocutors
available on the Government side. The brutal murders by unruly RGF soldiers of the
Prime Minister,
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Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, of other members of the Government and of 10
members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR were particularly tragic
consequences of the violence.
Efforts by UNAMIR
4. In this situation, it became impossible for UNAMIR to continue the tasks
emanating from its mandate. Responding to the security and humanitarian crises,
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UNAMIR, led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force
Commander, dedicated itself to the following efforts:
(a) Securing an agreement on a cease-fire, to be followed by political
negotiations between the two sides to restore the peace process under the Arusha
agreement;
(b) Protecting, as far as possible, United Nations civilian staff;
(c) Protecting, as far as possible, other civilians, both foreign and Rwandese
nationals;
(d) Negotiating a truce with the two parties in order to enable the evacuation of
expatriates to take place;
(e) Assisting in the evacuation of non-Rwandese civilians, both United Nations
and non-United Nations, by providing escorts for convoys to land borders and to the
airport, and coordinating with Belgian and French task forces sent for this purpose;
(f) Rescuing individuals and groups trapped in the fighting;
(g) Providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons
under the protection of UNAMIR.
5. The most urgent of those tasks was the first, the effort to secure a cease-fire
through contacts with representatives of the armed forces and the RPF, in the hope
that this would lead to political efforts to return to the peace process under the Arusha
agreement. The Security Council was kept fully informed of these efforts and other
developments on the ground. The decision by the Government of Belgium, following
the murder of its 10 soldiers in UNAMIR and threats to Belgian nationals, to withdraw
its battalion from UNAMIR introduced a new critical element into the deteriorating
situation. The Force Commander has been trying to obtain assurances from both
sides to declare the airport a neutral zone under UNAMIR's control. He initially
received such assurances, but before they could be formalized, RGF changed its
stand, leaving open the possibility that the airport could become a combat zone.
6. The members of the Council are aware that, despite direct contacts between
the two sides under the auspices of UNAMIR on 15 April 1994, which gave some
hope for progress towards a cease-fire, the efforts of UNAMIR have so far been
fruitless. Both sides have adopted rigid positions, with RPF presenting preconditions
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that RGF rejects. In this situation, I regretfully have concluded that there is no
prospect of a cease-fire being agreed upon in the coming days. Both the violence in
the streets and the fighting between RGF and RPF forces continue. This has brought
mortar attacks on concentrations of displaced civilians under UNAMIR protection.
UNAMIR headquarters also was hit on 19 April, although there were fortunately no
casualties.
7. The dedicated personnel of UNAMIR, who have performed courageously in
dangerous circumstances, cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no
possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched. With the
departure of the Belgian contingent and non-essential personnel from other
contingents, the reduced strength of military personnel in UNAMIR stood, on
20 April, at 1,515 (from 2,165) and Military Observers at 190 (from 321), for a total of
1,705 (from 2,486).
Options proposed
8. The Council will recall that in response to its request I presented, on 14 April,
two broad alternatives for dealing with this highly unstable and unpredictable state of
affairs in Rwanda. Both options were predicated on the establishment of a cease-fire,
without which it would be impossible for UNAMIR to continue to perform its
responsibilities under its present mandate.
9. The first option was to retain UNAMIR at a reduced strength (that is, without
the Belgian contingent) for a limited period of three or four weeks following the cease-
fire. The parties would have been required to reach agreement on the restoration of
the Arusha process within this period, in which case UNAMIR would resume its role
under its mandate. Otherwise, UNAMIR would be withdrawn in its totality.
10. The second option, following the cease-fire, was to withdraw the bulk of
UNAMIR, leaving my Special Representative and the Force Commander in Kigali to
act as intermediaries for political negotiations for an indefinite period, subject to
review by the Security Council, rather than the limited period envisaged in the first
alternative. In order to ensure the security of this United Nations team, about 200 to
300 United Nations military personnel would also have remained in Kigali.
11. The two options above were not mutually exclusive. If the efforts under the first
had failed to succeed by the end of the stipulated period, it would have been possible
to move to the second scenario, instead of withdrawing UNAMIR in its totality.
Observations
12. In the critical situation that continues to prevail, a decision must be reached on
whether, and if so, how, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to help a people
who have fallen into calamitous circumstances. I offer three alternatives for the
Council's consideration.
13. Alternative I. The first alternative is predicated on the conclusion, described
above, that there is no realistic prospect of the two opposing forces agreeing on an
effective cease-fire in the immediate future. Without a cease-fire, combat between
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them will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. This
situation could only be changed by the immediate and massive reinforcement of
UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorized to
coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order
and put an end to the killings. This also would make possible the provision and
distribution of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian agencies and non-
governmental organizations not only in the capital, but in other parts of the country
where the population has been displaced or subjected to deprivation as a result of
the violence. Further, the restoration of stability in Rwanda would assist in preventing
the repercussions of the violence from spreading to neighbouring countries and
leading to regional instability. This scenario would require several thousand additional
troops and UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations.
14. In this connection, I should report that the Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations called on me on 19 April with a plea to reinforce
UNAMIR to enable it to end the chaos in his country. In a telephone conversation on
20 April, President Museweni of Uganda urged that UNAMIR be reinforced and
retained in Rwanda, and asked me to convey his request to the Security Council. He
added that he was attempting to arrange for troop contributions from countries in the
region, and that he personally was directing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between
RGF and RPF.
15. Alternative II. The second alternative would be an amended form of the
second option presented to the Security Council on 14 April. In this scenario, a small
group headed by the Force Commander, with necessary staff, would remain in Kigali
to act as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an
agreement on a cease-fire, this effort being maintained for a period of up to two
weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. Additional tasks would include
assistance in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible in
this situation. UNAMIR has received assurances from both sides that they will
cooperate in such operations, though there can be no certainty that this will be done.
16. The team would require the support of an infantry company to provide security,
as well as a number of military observers to monitor the situation, apart from civilian
staff, the total being estimated at about 270. The remainder of UNAMIR personnel
would be withdrawn, but UNAMIR, as a mission, would continue to exist. The Special
Representative, with a small staff, would continue his efforts to resume his role as
intermediary in the political negotiations, with the aim of bringing back the two sides
to the Arusha peace process.
17. The arrangements outlined above could be terminated at any moment should
it appear that the parties were not cooperating at a political level, or if their activities
compromised the safety and security of the UNAMIR group in Kigali. 
18. The parties are being reminded that, although the United Nations system and
humanitarian agencies already have geared up to provide humanitarian relief and
assistance, only a limited amount could be distributed in the scenario outlined above.
A full relief effort would be impossible without a cease-fire.
7
19. Alternative III. The third alternative, which I do not favour, would be the
complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. If the Security Council were to decide on this
option, every effort would be made by UNAMIR to obtain commitments from the two
sides that they would take measures to ensure the safety of civilians in the areas
under their respective control. However, in view of the extreme nature and
dimensions of the violence and mass killings over the last two weeks, there is little
ground for hope that effective commitments could be obtained and it must be kept in
mind that the consequences of complete withdrawal, in terms of human lives lost,
could be very severe indeed. There could also be similar repercussions in
neighbouring countries where citizens of the ethnic groups found in Rwanda reside.
20. Ultimately, it is only the parties who signed the Arusha agreement, namely
the Government of Rwanda (or its successor) and RPF, who must bear the
responsibility for deciding whether their country and people find peace or continue to
suffer violence.
21. In presenting this report to the Security Council for its consideration, I would
like to express my deep sympathy to the Rwandan families who have lost their
relatives in these sad times for their country. I would also like to take this opportunity
once again to express my deep condolences to the Government of Belgium and to
the families of the 10 Belgian peace-keepers who paid with their lives in the cause of
peace. I also would like to record my high commendation to the personnel of
UNAMIR, in particular my Special Representative and the Force Commander, for the
selfless and courageous dedication with which they have devoted themselves to
doing their best for the United Nations in extremely hazardous circumstances.
